F. H. Jacobi and the Problem of Affection in Kant: A Methodological Solution

datacite.alternateIdentifier.citationTOPICOS-REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA,Vol.,2024
datacite.alternateIdentifier.doi10.21555/top.v690.2521
datacite.creatorGrez, Nicolas Guzman
datacite.date2024
datacite.subject.englishJacobi
datacite.subject.englishKant
datacite.subject.englishaffection
datacite.subject.englishthing in itself
datacite.subject.englishmethodolo- gy
datacite.titleF. H. Jacobi and the Problem of Affection in Kant: A Methodological Solution
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-27T18:27:19Z
dc.date.available2024-05-27T18:27:19Z
dc.description.abstractThis paper seeks to describe F. H. Jacobi's critique of transcendental philosophy concerning the problem of affection and the thing in itself. This critique attributes to Kant's thought an idealism incompatible with any notion of realism. Jacobi's interpretation, however, rests on an ignorance of the methodological -transcendental nature not only of the terminology involved in the problem of affection, but of the whole Kantian reflection about knowledge. The exegetical model of the two aspects view has provided instruments that allowed for a hermeneutical reconstruction of the problem of affection and put in evidence the methodological mistake present in Jacobi's critique.
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositoriodigital.uct.cl/handle/10925/5729
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUNIV PANAMERICANA. DEPT FILOSOFIA
dc.sourceTOPICOS-REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA
oaire.resourceTypeArticle
uct.indizacionESCI
Files