The Architecture of Cooperation: A Theoretical Proposal about Institutional Resilience

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datacite.alternateIdentifier.citationPOLITICA Y GOBIERNO,Vol.22,255-281,2015
datacite.creatorRosenblatt, Fernando
datacite.creatorToro Maureira, Sergio
datacite.date2015
datacite.subject.englishinstitutions
datacite.subject.englishresilience
datacite.subject.englishcooperation
datacite.titleThe Architecture of Cooperation: A Theoretical Proposal about Institutional Resilience
dc.date.accessioned2021-04-30T16:58:25Z
dc.date.available2021-04-30T16:58:25Z
dc.description.abstractIn Latin America, institutions are either fragile or excessively strong. These are the main conclusions that can be inferred by looking at the institutionalist literature that focuses in the region. Although there are numerous studies about the effects of both traits, there are few analyses about the determinants that explain such results. Taking advantage of this theoretical vacuum, this paper introduces an analytical typology that build upon historical and rational choice institutionalism. We argue that to have better assessments of institutional stability and resilience it is critical to focus on the range and timing of the agreements reached by the agents involved in the institutional design. We claim that this focus will help understand institutional stability and instability as well as their degree of legitimacy.
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositoriodigital.uct.cl/handle/10925/3672
dc.language.isoes
dc.publisherCENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y DOCENCIA ECONOMICAS
dc.sourcePOLITICA Y GOBIERNO
oaire.resourceTypeArticle
uct.catalogadorWOS
uct.indizacionSSCI
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