Echo chamber? Lobbying at the failed Chilean constitutional convention
Date
Authors
CUEVAS OSSANDON, RODRIGO ANDRES
Dockendorff, Andres
Cuevas Ossandon, Rodrigo
Dockendorff, Andres
Cuevas Ossandon, Rodrigo
Authors
Date
Datos de publicación:
10.1057/s41309-025-00246-w
Keywords
Constitutional convention - Lobby - Interest groups - Informational models
Collections
Abstract
What explains whom to lobby in constitutional assemblies or conventions? We present a model that leads to the expectation that ideological, social and ethnic affinities may induce deliberations among allies and acquaintances. We examine the case of Chile and test the implications of our model with data on lobbying exchanges at the failed Constitutional Convention (2021-2022). The results show that cause lobbies (i.e., environmentalists, sexual and gender minorities, human rights) focus more on leftists' delegates of the Constitutional Convention. Meanwhile, sectional lobbies (i.e., companies, economic groups) avoid more extreme leftists' representatives. Against our expectation, previous ties to social movements and reserved seats do not anticipate more lobbying from those groups.
Description
Keywords
Constitutional convention , Lobby , Interest groups , Informational models
Citation
10.1057/s41309-025-00246-w