Do you want to know a secret? Strategic alliances and competition in product markets

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datacite.alternateIdentifier.citationEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH,Vol.313,1180-1190,2024
datacite.alternateIdentifier.doi10.1016/j.ejor.2023.10.004
datacite.creatorTroncoso Valverde, Cristian
datacite.creatorChavez Bustamante, Felipe
datacite.date2024
datacite.subject.englishGame theory
datacite.subject.englishInformation
datacite.subject.englishStrategic alliances
datacite.subject.englishCompetition
datacite.subject.englishCooperation
datacite.titleDo you want to know a secret? Strategic alliances and competition in product markets
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-27T18:27:50Z
dc.date.available2024-05-27T18:27:50Z
dc.description.abstractStrategic alliances make firms' boundaries permeable to information leakages that may benefit the competitive position of partnering firms. In this paper, we examine the implications of information leakage on the incentives to join a strategic alliance and the nature of competition in the product market. We show that information leakage can trigger opportunistic behaviours in which firms engage in unprofitable alliances simply because the possibility of learning sensitive information about their competitors increases the expected private rents that firms earn when competing in the product market. Thus, our findings uncover a purely informational mechanism through which information leakage affects the incentives to join a strategic alliance that does not rely on the firm's ability to absorb spillovers from other firms. We also show that the incentives to devise alliances to gain access to the partner's sensitive private information may remain even if the negatively affected firm can pursue compensation for the damage that this deceptive business practice may cause.
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositoriodigital.uct.cl/handle/10925/5849
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherELSEVIER
dc.sourceEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
oaire.resourceTypeArticle
uct.indizacionSCI
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