

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Cátedra Fray Bartolomé de las Casas

Multicultural citizenship, conflict and a culture of peace

Agustín Domingo Moratalla

Ciudadanía multicultural, conflicto y cultura de la paz / AGUSTÍN DOMINGO MORATALLA

The Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Chair is an academic space created in the Catholic University of Temuco, inspired by the legacy of Padre de las Casas, which seeks to safeguard the essential value of the individual in order to take a fresh look at citizen coexistence and generate new practices of intercultural dialogue in the regional community and the country.

This university chair promotes reflection on themes which cut across the University and indeed society as a whole, such as justice, recognition and truth; a critical analysis of development models; and the relation between education, culture and knowledge, and the consideration of this relation in decision-making by various social actors.

Ricardo Salas Astraín
Director
Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Chair

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Multicultural citizenship, conflict and a culture of peace

Ethical keys for an intercultural policy

Agustín Domingo Moratalla

Prologue

We are pleased to present the third volume of the of the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Chair Book Collection, containing the Masterclass “Multicultural citizenship, conflict and a culture of peace” given by the philosopher Agustín Domingo Moratalla for the Chair in October 2010.

His visit was much more than the presentation published in this work. In an unforgettable week in which he visited Universidad Católica de Temuco, Agustín Domingo shared his thought with students, social scientists, theologians, teachers and lawyers, demonstrating a truly “dialogic” attitude.

Professor Domingo is situated in the Christian philosophical tradition which was renewed with Kant and passed through Hegel and Gadamer, among others, down to Ricoeur (his translations of the latter are recognized throughout the Spanish-speaking world). In this volume, and in his fertile intellectual production, he develops

what he himself proposes as a “Theory of Citizenship”, which “continues the ethical, political and legal tradition initiated by Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas”. Thus, in his own words, he is inspired by Padre de las Casas, who was the precursor of “a revolutionary citizenship programme which today we could call cosmopolitan, because they thought of human nature in global and universal terms”.

Profesor Domingo addresses all levels of the debate for a “Citizenship Ethic” from the categories of “recognition” and “conflict”; these are central aspects for his proposal of “Intercultural Citizenship”, which embraces areas from theology through moral philosophy, inter-religious dialogue, civic and moral education to political philosophy and legal philosophy. In this broad approach he works with notions of dialogue and deliberation; he presents a new reading of the concept of Justice and plunges into the debate between “liberalists” and “culturalists”.

Agustín Domingo sets up Human Dignity as the prime, axiological category, preceding any formal legal construction, which is at the same time the driving force of a law which seeks Justice and Peace for a “multicultural citizenship” sustained by “penetration of the human into the barbarism of being” (Levinás), and based on “ethical responsibility and obligation to one’s neighbour”; in which “the citizen as a person or communicated presence emerges, who by sharing ends and goals makes the world valuable because he constructs it in a key of co-responsibility, that is, of shared responsibility”. He also presents the dynamics of Recognition, which sets us in the context of the Araucanía Region and Indigenous peoples, with the associated debates and social,

political and cultural tensions, drawing attention to our non dialogic resistance.

Thus under these paradigms Agustín Domingo invites us to “dialogue”, noting that someone who holds “dialogue” with the other, as distinct from “duologue” – which he defines pedagogically as “two people talking at the same time” –, ceases to be the same, ceases to be himself, ceases to be in the same position; because after “dialoguing”, the other is also no longer in the same place, since he recognizes someone “other than I”, someone different who is in an asymmetrical relationship, who has different interests and visions of the world.

Domingo calls on us to reflect on “citizenship” and the “space for what is public”, to value “deliberation” and “public ethics”, in order to propose, from the standpoint of Human Dignity, “law at the service of man and not the other way round”.

Speaking on behalf of the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Chair, we respond to Agustín Domingo’s appeal to become a “space for interdisciplinary reflection”, where “areas of knowledge are not academically armoured, watertight compartments but paths by which we seek the truth in the service of peoples’ lives; a space for shared learning, civic friendship and real dialogue; a living dialogue between faith and reason, between faith and culture, between one culture and another.” A place where we discover “the value of being wrong”.

Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Chair.

Multicultural citizenship, conflict and a culture of peace

Ethical keys for an intercultural policy

Agustín Domingo Moratalla

"The right of the Spaniards to expound goodness and truth to the indians, and specifically to preach the christian faith, was no justification for the preaching of that same christian faith by means of prior armed violence, for that is the Mahommedan way, not the Christian way, since faith itself rejects such evangelization procedures and admits a single way of propounding and proclaiming it, the apostolic way: that of the gentle, humane invitation of persuasion and love…"[1]

"…the alternative to the idea of struggle in the process of mutual recognition must be sought in pacified experiences of mutual recognition, based on symbolic mediation divorced both from the legal order and from commercial interchange; the exceptional character of these experiences, far from disqualifying them, underlines their gravity, and thus guarantees their irradiating, irrigating force in the very centre of the transactions marked with the seal of struggle"[2].

1 Synthesis of the ideas of F. Bartolomé de Las Casas collected by I. Pérez, Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas. Editorial OPE, Burgos, 1984, p. 89.
2 P. Ricoeur, Caminos del Reconocimiento. Trotta, Madrid, p. 227.

Introdution

My first words are of gratitude to professor Ricardo Salas and thanks to Universidad Católica de Temuco for their invitation to me to continue the work started in the last course of the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Chair. This invitation is not only an honour, it is also an important responsibility in my professional career, for three reasons. Firstly because it links my name with that of Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, a daring and fascinating preacher who is little known to the history of Ethics, Politics and Law as it is taught today in university courses. With other sixteenth century philosophers and theologians, he formed part of the group of thinkers whom we call the *Salamanca School*, a strong group of polemicists named after that city who questioned the legitimacy of the entitlement to the conquest and, for the first time, laid the foundations of what would become Modern International Law defending the rights of the indians. This launched an ethical, political and legal tradition which reached one of its high points with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.

Secondly because I am the second teacher to speak to this Chair, and thus form part of a *chain of university research* which places its trust in dialogue, mutual understanding and human reason as the best way to resolve conflicts. This space for interdisciplinary reflection is the best proof that subjects, disciplines or areas of knowledge are not academically armoured, watertight compartments but paths by which we seek truth in the service of peoples' lives.

Thirdly, I am discovering that this Chair is a space for shared learning, civic friendship and real dialogue: a living dialogue between faith and reason, between faith and culture, between one culture and another, and even between two people who are assumed to have the same culture. A dialogue not only between religions or cultures, but between individuals, to clarify the supposed opacity of their differences or misunderstandings. It is the best proof that the identity of traditions, cultures and peoples depends on how they are vitalized by the people who compose them. As a space for learning, it is a place where we discover the value of being wrong, the value of the opinion or judgment of the other, and above all, where we forge a *shared narrative identity* on the anvil of a word made life. A space constructed with what we may call a *willingness or attitude for dialogue.*

These allusions to a city (Salamanca), an institution (university) and an attitude (dialogue), provide me with a starting point for the lecture I have been asked to give on the relationship between multicultural citizenship, conflict and a culture of peace. Without stating it explicitly, Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas and the Salamanca School initiated a revolutionary citizenship

programme which today we could call cosmopolitan, because they thought of human nature in global and universal terms. By thinking of all human beings as creatures of a single creator, that is, thinking of every human being as a fragile, vulnerable image of the same God, they gained a moral horizon which enables us to construct a *real moral universalism, recorded in history and incarnate (applied)*. This statement lives on in the contemporary debate on citizenship, and the university as an institute of learning cannot remain unresponsive to this challenge. As is shown by the character of Fray Bartolomé and his testimony, Moral Theology and what we today would call Moral Philosophy either are applied forms of knowledge or they are not forms of knowledge at all; and here I use application to mean the moment of the discovery of values, the clarification of obligations and the realization of goods.

In the contexts of globalisation, universities are called to bear important responsibilities, because they are not spaces merely of teaching and learning but of and for dialogue. This means that our universities not only offer spaces to enable social agents to transform their everyday disagreements into institutional encounters, but that they themselves are spaces to enable social agents to make the spaces of the city, in its cosmopolitan sense, habitable. And further, in addition to being spaces of and for dialogue, they are active agents committed to what we might call a *diligent social dialogue*. And therefore we must ask ourselves whether we can construct this dialogue from any theory of citizenship, and how we can clarify, justify and carry out a citizenship programme which continues the ethical, political and legal tradition initiated by Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas.

To answer these questions, and to limit myself to the title of the address which I have been asked to give, I will divide my presentation into three parts. In the first I will analyse the concept of intercultural citizenship as one of the ways opened up by citizenship theories to meet the challenge of the plurality of cultures. In the second I will address recognition as a category which has formed an element of the structural character of conflict in citizenship theories. Finally, in the third part I will describe some of the basic tasks through which a culture of peace can be promoted and constructed. For this I will recover the tension which Ricoeur establishes between reciprocity and mutuality, not to make a conceptual or theoretical analysis of the problems generated by the category of recognition in ethics and contemporary political philosophy, but to recover the models of rationality which are fed by a cordial intelligence using what Fray Bartolomé would call "the gentle, humane invitation of persuasion and love", a type of intelligence without which our democracies would lack vigour, and which is fed by the mediation of symbols because, as Paul Ricoeur says, *symbols make us think*[3].

3 This is the title of the conclusion of Paul Ricoeur's book, Finitud y Culpabilidad. Taurus, Madrid, 1982, 489. "The danger of illusion lies not in seeking a starting point, but in seeking it to the exclusion of all previous assumptions" (p. 490)

1. Multicultural citizenship and the fusion of horizons

1.1 From the world of life to the world of politics

There are ever more problems of ethics and contemporary politics which turn on citizenship. This term is used to describe the belonging and participation of the individual in a political community, not only as a *passive subject* but as an *active subject.* It describes the way in which an individual links himself to and is a member of a community, in other words it describes a condition or dimension of life in common. Regardless of the size of the local communities, we refer to the citizen as a member of a political community. Without embarking on a description of the history of the concept of citizenship, it is important to note that it describes life in the city of free men, not of slaves or members of another community. Coexistence within each city is regulated by a series of rights and obligations. Therefore the condition of citizen is related to the practice or exercise of citizenship; that is, with the rights and obligations exercised with respect to a human group in a determined physical, cultural and symbolic space[4].

4 An explanatory analysis of citizenship is found in A. Cortina, Ciudadanos del mundo.

When a citizen is conscious of his rights and fulfils his obligations, he practices a virtue which we call *civility*, without which solidarity and social cohesion are impossible. We may ask: Is a coercive, imposed legislation sufficient to achieve cohesion? Are liberty and the formal equality of legislation sufficient? What role is played by the *liberty and equality* of persons in the different forms of participation? What role is played by *cultural values and traditions* in cohesion?

To answer these questions we should have to present in detail the different theories of citizenship and show the historical evolution of the concept. This is a complex transformation from which we will retain two ideas. On the one hand, the importance of the philosophical traditions which emerge from the *world of life* to modify what had been proposed as a strictly legal or political citizenship. In other words, the critique of idealism and psychologism made by the philosophies of the beginning of the twentieth century (phenomenology, hermeneutics, personalism) leads to a transformation in political ethics under which the *world of life* bursts into the *world of politics*. After the Second World War citizenship is no longer only a political or administrative problem of how to understand traditional ideologies like liberalism and socialism, but a social problem which affects all the dimensions of life in common: not only the political or administrative dimension, or that of demanding rights, but the social or cultural dimension in the broadest sense of the word. This tradition always reminds us that the human being is not only a political animal but also biographical and symbolic animal. Unlike an animal which adapts to its environment, the human being is forced to

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Hacia una teoría de la ciudadanía. Alianza, Madrid, 1997.

justify himself, in other words to give a reason (or reasons) for what he does to occupy or exist in the world.

1.2 Culture as a responsibility in the face of the threat of barbarianism

Secondly we need to delimit the concept of culture which we are using if we want to make our reflections on multicultural citizenship really fruitful. It is difficult to reflect philosophically on citizenship without anthropological and cultural assumptions, and for that reason I would like to recall the ethical dimension which underlies these reflections on multicultural citizenship. This is a dimension which I take from Levinas in the following words:

> "Culture is not a passing over or a neutralization of transcendence; it *consists in ethical responsibility and obligation to one's neighbour*, a relation with transcendence as transcendence. We could call it love. It is ordered by the face of the other human, which is not a datum of experience and which does not come from the world. Penetration of the human into the barbarism of being, even when *no philosophy in history can guarantee that barbarism will not return*"[5].

As may be observed, it is not a usual definition – but it is a radical definition. Instead of referring to the totality of the knowledge, expressions, manifestations or ways of life of a human group, he refers to *ethical responsibility and obligation to one's*

5 Cf. E. Levinas, Humanismo del otro hombre. Caparrós, Madrid, 1993, pp. 61 f.

neighbour. He even uses the word love to summarise its meaning, leaving aside all the sentimental dimensions of this concept to associate it with the concept of responsibility. As we can see, it is not an accumulation of data which belong to the worlds in which we live, but an imperative or order which is born of the face of the other. Instead of proposing culture linked to the humanism of the "I" or the "we", Levinas proposes culture in association with the face of the other. When he says that it is demanded by the face of the other, he is breaking with a habitual, monological way of thinking and referring us to a shared logos, a rationale which is shared and even required by the relationship.

What is radical in this approach is the use of the term barbarianism. Culture exists when we break into the resignation of what exists, when we perforate and drill into reality in its human dimension without accepting the habitual, the quotidian, the routine. Penetration of the human into the barbarism of being means here the irruption of responsibility into a world of anonymous, impersonal and homogenising relations. What is also radical is the conceptual precariousness and the philosophical vulnerability of this exercise of penetration; in other words, no system of thought, no ideology or utopia, can offer us guarantees that it has put a final end to barbarism. Thus what Levinas calls barbarianism is a permanent threat, perhaps the permanent reminder that routine, homogeneity and depersonalisation are a permanent temptation in all reflections on culture.

According to this basic proposal, the delimiting of a multicultural citizenship changes horizon. We broaden the horizon of the liberal theories of citizenship in which the *citizen as an individual,* a social atom, or an abstract or rootless subject, disappears, and

the *citizen as a person* or communicated presence emerges, who by sharing ends and goals makes the world valuable because he constructs it *in a key of co-responsibility*, that is, of shared responsibility. With this ethical and anthropological horizon, the debate between liberal and communitarian citizenship is enriched for three reasons. Firstly because citizenship theory is proposed from an ethic of responsibility for the face of the other. Secondly because the socio-political condition of citizen is measured from the ethical-axiological condition of person as communicated presence. And thirdly because citizenship does not forget the historical, social and cultural context in which life under standards becomes valuable. And at this point we can briefly present the concept of multicultural citizenship as it appears in Charles Taylor's famous text, collected of Amy Gutmann, entitled *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"*[6].

In this essay, Taylor himself draws on a valuable text by Roger Kimball where he not only criticises multiculturalist arguments but also recalls that culture requires an effort because it is a fragile achievement:

> "In spite of the multiculturalists, the option facing us today is not between a "repressive" western culture and a multicultural paradise, but between culture and barbarianism. Civilization is not a gift, it is an achievement: a fragile achievement which must be constantly expurgated and defended against its attackers from without and within." (PR,105)

6 A. Gutmann (editor), El multiculturalismo y la "política del reconocimiento". FCE, México 1993. The central part is Charles Taylor's essay entitled The Politics of Recognition, followed by commentaries by S. Wolf, S. C. Rockefeller and M. Walzer. Below we will cite from the body of the text as PR followed by the page number.

1.3 Multicultural citizenship and the demand for recognition

The aim of Charles Taylor's reflections in this essay is to analyse the role of cultural differences in liberal theories of citizenship. Unlike a liberal citizenship which, in principle, is misunderstood from cultural traditions in the organization of political life, multicultural citizenship is characterized by *applying policies of recognition* which correct, rectify or modulate blind liberal egalitarianism. Policies which are found in some nationalist movements and which are formulated in the name of minority groups, ethnic minorities, certain varieties of feminism or what in politics is called "multiculturalism". According to Kymlicka, this term describes very different forms of cultural pluralism and addresses two perspectives to propose cultural diversity in a single political space:

(a) cultural diversity which arises from the incorporation of cultures which previously enjoyed self-government and have been concentrated into a larger state. Kymlicka calls these cultural minorities *national minorities*, because they want to continue to differentiate themselves from the majority culture of which they form a part. In these cases, recognition policies are policies of autonomy or self-government to ensure the survival not only of cultural traditions but of the culturally differentiated human group.

(b) diversity which arises due to *migratory movements*, at both an individual and a community level. Immigrants tend to form flexible associations called ethnic groups. These groups or minorities want to become *integrated* into the society of which they form a part, and to be accepted as full members of that society. Although at times they try to obtain a greater *recognition of their*

ethnic identity, their objective is not to become a separate or self-governing nation but to modify the institutions and laws of the society to make it more permeable to cultural differences[7].

While in the first perspective the concept of culture is highly charged politically because it identifies the concept cultural minority with that of *national minority,* in the second the accent is on *integration.* These perspectives turn *multicultural citizenship* into a complex model in which recognition may be proposed in very different forms, ranging from *legal protection for minorities* to the *promotion of shared narratives* which facilitate integration. This complexity makes it more difficult to establish clear differences between a *multicultural citizenship* and an *intercultural citizenship*, using Taylor's reflections indifferently for either. In our judgment, the recognition demanded by Taylor respects this complexity because it is born of an ethical ideal of human dignity which points in two directions: the protection of the basic rights of persons as such, and the identification and promotion of the particular needs of persons as members of determined cultural groups or historical communities.

1.4 The cultural complexity of liberal egalitarianism

In the first part of his essay, Taylor presents the demand for recognition as a problem of identity: "our identity is moulded in part by recognition or its lack" (PR, 46). In his analysis, he indicates a few factors which have contributed to the problematical character of recognition: (a) the disappearance of a culture of hierarchies

7 W. Kymlicka. Ciudadanía multicultural. Paidós, Barcelona, 1996, pp. 25-26.

in exchange for a culture of dignity; (b) the transformation of identity into an individualized identity with the result that problems of recognition are also problems of authenticity or fidelity to the sources of the ego; (c) the dialogical constitution of personal identity through significant others; (d) the mutual dependence of identities; (e) careful consideration of the conditions in which the attempt to be recognized may fail. According to these proposals, personal identity has no social recognition *a priori,* but must be earned by exchange and the attempt may fail.

If, at the intimate level of personal life, we can appreciate to what point a personal identity needs to be, and indeed is, vulnerable to the recognition given it by others, it is more so at the social level of human life. As Taylor says: "the interpretation that identity is constructed in open dialogue, and is not formed following a predefined social script, has meant that the politics of egalitarian recognition occupies a position of greater weight and importance… Egalitarian recognition is not only the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society: its rejection is damaging… Projection on the other of an inferior or humiliating image may in fact deform and oppress to the point that this image becomes internalized" (PR. 58).

The central parts of his essay are devoted to showing the cultural complexity of liberal egalitarianism. Firstly he analyses the concept of egalitarian respect and states that there are two ways of understanding it: (a) treating all persons as equal and being blind to the differences, (b) recognising and fostering particularity. The reproach which the former makes to the latter is that it violates the liberal principle of non discrimination; while the reproach

which the latter may make to the former is that it denies identity when it constrains people in moulds of homogeneity. And further, it proposes that the blindness to difference found in policies of egalitarian dignity is, in reality, a reflection of a hegemonic culture. Thus: "the supposedly just society, blind to differences, is not only inhuman (in that it suppresses identities) but it is also thoroughly discriminatory… The accusation made by the more radical forms of the policy of difference is that the very blindness of liberalism is a reflection of particular cultures… particularism disguised as universality." (PR, 67-68). In this context, there are two ways of understanding liberalism.

a.- Liberalism of rights which does not tolerate difference because (a) it insists on the uniform application of the rules which define those rights without exception, and (b) it mistrusts collective goals. This does not mean that this liberalism suppresses cultural differences. However it is intolerant of difference because it has no room for what the members of the different societies aspire to, which is survival.

b.- Liberalism which is open to cultural differences with the capacity to distinguish the level of basic rights and the level of substantive goals or differences which are a source of value in people's lives. Liberal equality on the principle of non discrimination is often applied as a uniform treatment which places no value on differences which play a substantive role in the life projects of citizens. A substantive role because they form part of the projects for a good life of citizens, and therefore occupy an important place in the integrity of cultures. A society is multicultural when it includes more than one cultural community which wants to survive.

Here liberal egalitarianism is applied as procedural liberalism and remains blind to the differences, and is thus able to impede what Taylor calls the "flourishing" of cultures.

As a result of the controversy which arose from the publication of *The Satanic Verses* by Salman Rushdie, and which has remained at an exacerbated level since the attacks of 11 September 2001, these forms of understanding liberal egalitarianism are not ethically innocuous. According to mainstream Islam, where there is no separation between politics and religion[8], liberalism is not a possible field for a meeting between all cultures, but the political expression of a certain culture, apparently incompatible with others. For this current in Islam, western liberalism is not so much the expression of a secular, post-religious viewpoint popularized by liberal intellectuals, as a more organic offshoot of christianity. Thus liberalism cannot and should not attribute itself with complete cultural neutrality – it too is a fighting creed (PR, 92-93).

Now, the variant of liberal egalitarianism proposed by Taylor supposes a moral reflection on absolute limits in certain actions. There are variations when it comes to the application of rights, but not when it comes to incitement to murder (Ibid.). In the non procedural or communitarian liberalism which defends this position, it is not necessarily a contradiction because "substantive distinctions of this kind are inevitable in politics" (Ibid.). It recognises the difficulty of these limits and agreements when it asks the question: "Do we

8 We have analysed this separation between politics and religion in our book Ciudadanía activa y religión. Fuentes pre-políticas de la ética democrática. Encuentro, Madrid, 2011, 2nd edition. Charles Taylor presents a moral phenomenology of the concept of secularization in A Secular Age. Belknap Press, New York, 2007.

permit or prohibit murder?" To avoid this conceptual dilemma of liberal politics, it turns to the ethics of recognition.

1.5 Cultural porosity and the fusion of horizons

With recognition in liberal egalitarianism, a double requirement appears: (a) to allow cultures to defend themselves within reasonable limits and (b) that all the members who participate in this liberal egalitarianism should recognize the *equal value* of the differences. This latter requirement raises the central problem when it reminds us that the political challenge does not lie in the simple acceptance or passive tolerance of differences, but in considering the differences as sources and bearers of value. If this does not occur, communities may fall apart, not only because there is no positive action to reinforce them, but because no value is given to these forms of community life. It is not a matter of merely guaranteeing and protecting the requirements of communities, but of recognizing them as valuable for certain groups of citizens. That is where recognition politics stands today.

For Taylor this does not mean defending the idea that all communitarian projects or all cultural traditions have the same value. As we have shown in other works, this variant of liberalism held by Taylor, with a certain proximity to communitarian personalism, is not a contextualist or ethnocentric liberalism which ignores the problem of limits, judgment and value[9]. In his opinion,

9 As we have shown in our works: "Ética y liberalismo. Un análisis filosófico y político": Diálogo Filosófico 42 (1998), 308-341; "Horizontes éticos de ciudadanía activa. El lugar de la filosofía política en el pensamiento contemporáneo": Diálogo Filosófico 66 (2006),

there is an assumption with which we must work when we analyse the relation between politics and culture: when societies have been inspired for long periods of time by certain cultural traditions, these always have something important to say to all human beings.

Taylor analyses this assumption and indicates that here we are facing what Gadamer calls the "fusion of horizons". This assumption is important for thinking jointly about the communitarianist variant of liberal egalitarianism which Taylor proposes and the philosophical bases for an intercultural ethic. Fusion does not describe a process in which cultural traditions are added together, conflated, amassed or accumulated in a given society. Fusion of horizons describes the mobility which occurs when we engage in dialogue and understand one another. Mutual understanding between different individuals occurs when one recognizes that one's horizon of life or of comprehension is not closed but open. In social dialogue, a meeting of horizons occurs which allows people to broaden, extend and enrich the limits of their comprehension. They do not leap from one horizon to another, but recognize themselves in a new horizon in which they share[10].

To perceive the scope of this fusion of horizons it is important to remember that the members of a certain cultural community do no simply ask for acceptance, tolerance or condescension. They claim respect, which means a value commitment to their

pp. 388-421.

10 I have analysed the close relationship between dialogue and fusion of horizons in two previous works: El arte de poder no tener razón. La hermenéutica dialógica de Gadamer. Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, Salamanca 1989; "Pensamiento dialógico y cambio cultural. Diálogo y responsabilidad en la ética contemporánea", in VV.AA.; El Diálogo. III Seminario del Desierto de las Palmas, Monte Carmelo, Burgos, 2007, pp. 33-79.

proposals; in other words, an exercise in recognition as a practice of political discernment so as not to distort the ethical, political and cultural reality which is at stake. Many cultures have contributed a meaningful horizon to large numbers of human beings over long periods of time; that is to say, they have articulated projects for a good life, for relations with the sacred and the admirable, which we must respect. Respect understood in its strongest sense, that is to say, esteem and value in order to discern reasonably between the large amount which can be admired and the large amount which can be rejected. To exercise this discernment and avoid arrogance, it is important to "assume our limited participation in human history" (PR, 107).

As Walzer indicates in his commentary, we have here two ways of understanding liberal equality, and also two types of liberalism. Liberalism 1 is strictly neutral (without cultural or religious perspectives, blind to personal goals which go beyond personal liberty and physical safety). Liberalism 2 is a variant of the first as a state committed to the survival and flourishing of a particular tradition, culture or religion; or even "a group of nations, cultures or religions, in so far as the basic rights of citizens who have different commitments, or none at all, are protected"[11]. This second Liberalism 2 is one of the options of Liberalism 1.

We could say that the first class of Liberalism is the official doctrine of immigrant societies, where a (macro) social union of (micro) social unions has been formed. Micro social unions are plural and free, but do not receive state assistance, and are all

11 M. Walzer, Comentario a Ch. Taylor, PR, pp. 139 ff.

in danger if the principle of neutrality is applied without the ethics of recognition. The survival of micro social unions is not only a challenge to history and numbers, but also to wealth and power. For this reason, multicultural citizenship policies are a challenge for the ways in which wealth and power are distributed in a society, a radical challenge which seeks to equate or compensate risks, and also to minimise the dangers for the survival of all the micro social unions. To do this the macro social union (the state) must assume responsibility for the cultural survival of all. In this sense, the dialectic of recognition demands not only that Liberalism 1 should allow Liberalism 2, but that from Liberalism 2 it should be possible to choose Liberalism 1.

This political discernment is not easy because it demands careful consideration, realism and a clear ethical determination. In this sense, Taylor and Walzer agree on the need to break with abstractions and short-sighted proposals which forget the "here and now" (PR, 145). In this way they recover a basic and original dialogical hermeneutic which is not always present in citizenship theories; a hermeneutic anchored in recognition but which does not avoid conflict. How can we propose the fusion of horizons in such a way that it ceases to be the unattainable objective of an intercultural citizenship and becomes an institutional reality?

2. Conflict and the struggle for recognition

Conflict is an important category of political philosophy which has become topical in debates on multicultural citizenship with the emergence of the politics of recognition as politics of difference. It is a category linked with the hermeneutical updating of Hobbes or Hegel, and supposes a critical review of modernity. Charles Taylor has sustained that two conceptions of modernity are in play. He announces them when he asks whether a catholic modernity exists in his study *A Catholic Modernity?*[12], and later returns to them in *Dilemmas and Connections* (2011), a preparatory essay to his great book *A Secular Age* (2007)[13]. On the one hand, an abstract concept of modernity as a rational reference of liberty, equality and solidarity, as if a rational, abstract model existed of industrialized, secularized, individualized modern society with these great values. On the other, a historical concept of modernity as a reference configured from different forms and manners; in this case, modernity is a historical, plural process which will lead us to speak of modernities in the plural.

12 Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.
13 Both edited by Belknap, Harvard.

I am starting from this point because the philosophical interpretation of conflicts, struggles and human interaction is conditioned by the hermeneutic of the modernity which we maintain. Now is not the moment to expand on this, but the importance of this problem must be noted. This starting point is present implicitly in the ethics of recognition, and explicitly in the Hegelian updating of the concept of recognition[14]. I will pause on three subjects which I consider important for the social context of the Chair: firstly the fact that recognition is not a trivial or minor issue in ethics, because life itself is at stake. Recognition is nothing less than a fight to the death in the terminology of Hegel. Secondly, a brief presentation of the position of A. Honneth, as one who continues the proposals of the continental tradition and was an important interlocutor with Ricoeur when he constructed his ethic of justice in the horizon of a culture of peace. Finally I will propose a distinction picked up by Paul Ricoeur when he differentiates between *reciprocal recognition* and *mutual recognition*[15]. These clarifications allow us to orient reflections on *multicultural citizenship* towards a model of citizenship which has not yet been created, but which we can describe as *intercultural citizenship.*

14 Cf. L. M. de la Maza, "Actualizaciones de concepto hegeliano de reconocimiento": Veritas 23 (2010), pp. 67-94.

15 Cf. P. Ricoeur, Caminos del reconocimiento. Trotta, Madrid, 2005. From here on we will cite the book in the body of the text as CR followed by the page number in this edition.

2.1 The struggle to the death for recognition

As professor Mariano de la Maza has said, in recent years the concept of recognition has transcended the framework of philosophical discussion between Hegel specialists and has become a recurrent theme in philosophical anthropology, ethics, social philosophy and political philosophy[16]. In the context of phenomenology, hermeneutics and the ethics of discourse, recognition has emerged as a problem when we propose conditions for dialogue, or transcendental presumptions for discussion, about the *lack of symmetry* in human relations. One of these ethical explanations of conflict lies in the lack of symmetry between interlocutors, in the structural inequality of those who wish to understand one another, in the difference of identities when establishing a conversation under basic conditions of equality. A lack of symmetry, the roots of which go down to a *tragic conception of philosophy* which phenomenological and hermeneutical ethics continues to keep alive[17].

Here are situated the comments which J. Habermas made on Taylor's proposal, analysed above[18]. For Habermas, Taylor has taken an important step because he has brought into the discussion the substantive, communitarian dimension of identity. Now, in his judgment the dialectic proposed between Liberalism 1 and Liberalism 2 is not easy. For Habermas, in situations of conflict we are forced to opt for one Liberalism or the other, they are not

16 M. de la Maza, *Op. cit.* p. 68.
17 Cf. R. Maliandi, Cultura y conflicto. Investigaciones éticas y antropológicas. Biblos, Buenos Aires 1984.
18 J. Habermas, "La lucha por el reconocimiento en el estado democrático de derecho", in La inclusión del otro. Paidós, Barcelona, 1999, pp. 189-230.

comparable versions which allow us to switch from one to the other on a whim. Habermas proposes a policy which *ensures* the survival of a form of life which is considered good (which we have called micro social units) at the cost of *restricting* under certain conditions some of the basic rights of the majority (which we have called macro social units). To this end, instead of thinking of the identity of citizens individually, he turns to a resource which is habitual in modern theorists of positive law who distinguish private from public morals. The solution lies in distinguishing two types of autonomy in the moral subject: private autonomy and public autonomy.

For Habermas, the theory of law which we need in pluricultural contexts requires a policy of recognition which protects the identity of individuals even in the contexts of life which configure their identity. No alternative model is required which corrects the individualist tendency of the legal system with a procedural conception of law. What is required is a *consequent realization*. Thus the struggle for recognition becomes a resistance struggle, such as we see today in social movements like pacifism, feminism, multiculturalism, nationalism and, as professor De la Maza says, in those who make a stand against the Eurocentric inheritance of colonialism[19].

When Habermas speaks of consequent realization he situates the problem of recognition in the face of what traditional hermeneutics called the *moment of application.* He situates it at the level of the world of life as a space where asymmetry is not a philosophical category but a factual reality, where liberal equality is

19 *Op. cit.*, 78.

little more than a Kantian regulative ideal and where the different communities which we have described above as micro social unions articulate their traditions not only as programmes for coexistence but of mere existence or even survival within society. By situating it thus, he obliges us necessarily to recover the Aristotelian concept of *phronesis* which, as Ricoeur has said:

> "indicates the contemporary resource of a hermeneutic of application, since it is a question of interpreting situations in which correlations can be shown between recognition of validity on the plane of the regulations, and recognition of capacities on the plane of persons. Struggles for legal recognition come under the aegis of this mixed intelligence of regulatory obligations and the situations in which people exercise their competencies" (CR, 207)[20].

Perhaps this is the moment for practice as opposed to theory, of immediate knowledge as opposed to reflective knowledge, of ordinary knowledge as opposed to scientific knowledge. It is the moment which describes a historical compromise between speculative demands and empirical experience, or perhaps also of direct action as opposed to indirect institutional or parliamentary action[21]. This is the starting point for the concept of recognition

20 In this context the extension of the regulatory sphere of rights should be analysed. In the contexts of globalization and digital citizenship have occurred those extensions which we analysed in "Infoética y derechos humanos: posibilidades y límites de la ciudadanía digital": Revista de fomento social, 64:256 (2009), pp. 735-755.

21 I here use the term indirect action in the sense of Ortega, as an action which is carried out institutionally by representatives. Direct action would be the social action of masses, movements and assemblies, while indirect action would be reflective action by means of words, the rules of the game backed up by law, and in short political action through a liberal or representative democracy in the most general sense given to the term at the end of the nineteenth century. Cf. J. Ortega , La España invertebrada. In Obras Completas, vol. III, Rev. Occidente-Taurus, Madrid, 2005, pp. 433 ff.

as claimed by A. Honneth in his famous work entitled *La lucha por el reconocimiento. Por una gramática moral de los conflictos sociales*[22].

2.2 From conflict to recognition in the ethic of A. Honneth

In his investigation into the importance of conflict in the political ethic of Habermas, professor Pablo Mella sustains that Honneth takes up the value that the dynamics of interaction had in the first Habermas for the construction of his theory of recognition. In Mella's view, Honneth recovers a philosophical factor which was present in Habermas, but which he forgets in order to construct the *Theory of Communicative Action.* He calls this factor "the Hegel of Jena", however he does not recover it with critical pretensions but to recall that at this time Hegel based recognition on the experience of love in the family environment, and in the being considered as a person in the ambit of formal contract law[23]. These relations serve as a basis for the construction of a more general theory of recognition where the role of the State is proposed.

In Mella's judgment, the Habermas of the *Theory of communicative* action only remembers the family in the legalization processes, and not the socialization processes. It is here that Honneth recovers Hegel and marks his distance from Habermas, because there is a displacement from the legal dimension of recognition to its psychological and sociological dimension. This importance of the narrowest circles of socialization is qualified by

22 Edited by Crítica, Barcelona, 1997.

23 Cf. P. Mella, El conflicto social en la teoría de Habermas. Doctoral dissertation in the Catholic University of Leuven, Leuven, 1999. Especially pages 237-245.

professor Mella as “the shoe”, the heart or the Gordian knot of the problem of relations between recognition and conflict[24]. As Ricoeur would later say:

> “It is in this moment of love, of the family and the child, that Honneth will later discern the first of the three models of recognition, thanks to the extrapolation permitted by his abandonment of the absolute speculative viewpoint. In the Hegel of Jena, recognition follows legal relations” (CR, 190).

Without going into the details of the interpretation of Hegel on this point, we can say that struggle and conflict mark the transition from injustice to respect, from disdain to consideration. The dynamics of the conflict are permanent dynamics of recognition. As Ricoeur says:

> “…they initiate a history of the struggle for recognition which continues to be meaningful in our days, as the institutional structure of recognition continues to be inseparable from the negative dynamism of the whole process, since every institutional conquest corresponds to a specific negative threat; this correlation between the level of injustice and the level of recognition illustrates the familiar adage according to which we see the unjust more clearly than the just; in this point, indignation represents, in a political philosophy based on the plea for recognition, the role represented in Hobbes by fear of a violent death” (CR, 182).

24 P. Mella, *Op. cit.* p. 240.

Without commenting on these reflections of Ricoeur, I dare to take up three of Honneth's contributions which are important for the interpretation of social interaction as conflict and struggle for recognition.

a.- His strategy combines various procedures and combines philosophical speculation (Hegel) with empirical analysis (Mead). This means that we are in the presence of a motivated conflict, in other words we start from actions of resistance or experiences of offences against intuitive ideas of justice which form part of the world of life. The moral conscience of injustice does not appeal to a coherent table of values as its reference; rather it translates a well-developed sensitivity to the offences perpetrated against moral demands which are admitted as legitimate[25].

b.- He describes three spheres of intersubjective recognition, presented successively as love, law and social esteem. These spheres correspond to three figures of the denial of recognition which are able to supply a negative moral motivation to social struggles: the family, the state and a horizon of common values. When these spheres are infringed upon, struggles for recognition are triggered[26].

c.- In spite of the fact that obtaining social recognition is a regulatory condition of communicational activity, the root of recognition is in the person who suffers humiliation or outrage. The person wants to be recognised in his dignity, and so he fights when his dignity is outraged, degraded or humiliated.

25 A. Honneth, *Op. cit.* p. 114. Cf. P. Mella, p. 242.
26 A. Honneth, *Op. cit.*, 204.

d.- The struggle for recognition is more important than the struggle for distribution, which signifies recognising that the economic motivation of conflicts of interests must be reconstructed from more basic moral motivations. He does not underestimate the economic dimension of the class struggle or conflict of interests to obtain a fairer distribution of resources; he reinterprets distribution from the angle of recognition. For this he refers to Marx, since he considers that Marx did not propose the class struggle only as a means for economic ends, but also for the moral end of gaining respect[27].

2.3 Reciprocal recognition and mutual recognition

On the path towards a culture of peace, we may recover the distinction made by Ricoeur between reciprocal recognition and mutual recognition. The paths of Hegel, Honneth and Taylor are very useful to him in developing a phenomenology of conflict when he studies struggles for recognition. Now, as Tomás Domingo has said, recognition is the leading thread in the latest works of Paul Ricoeur[28]. If up to now we have spoken solely of reciprocal recognition, from now on we must talk of mutual recognition. Why? What does mutuality add to reciprocity? Must we abandon reciprocity to reach mutuality?

Although in everyday language we do not always use correctly these two ways of understanding recognition, Ricoeur differentiates them because they offer an alternative to the idea of

27 A. Honneth, *op. cit,* 134-136. Cf. P. Mella, 244.
28 T. Domingo, "Del sí mismo reconocido a los estados de paz. P. Ricoeur: caminos de hospitalidad": Pensamiento 62 (2006), pp. 203-230.

struggle. We might say that he does not accept that struggle should have the last word in moral and political philosophy. He seeks an alternative to struggle and finds it in *pacified experiences of mutual recognition* which, as we noted in the original text, rest on *symbolic mediation* divorced both from the legal order and from commercial interchange. This is important: the world of law and the world of economics do not have the last word in the ethics of recognition

The pacified experiences of recognition to which Ricoeur refers are also described as states of peace. The three states of peace to which he refers are *philia, eros and agape.* The latter has always played an important role in Ricoeur's work because it has always been a counter-concept with which he constructed his theory of justice; in the face of the logic of equivalence (justice) appears the logic of superabundance (love, *agape*); in the face of the moral tradition of interest (Habermas) appears the moral tradition of love as disinterestedness (Levinas). Now, *agape* fulfils a critical function in reciprocity for a simple reason: "it transcends the discrete acts of individuals in the situation of gift exchange" (CR, 228). What does this mean? Firstly that with mutuality appears an *ethic of giving* which obliges us to propose moral calculations and equivalences: "Agape makes reference to equivalences useless, because it ignores comparison and calculation" (CR, 229). Secondly, *agape* declares and proclaims itself, while justice bases itself on argument.

The introduction of mutual recognition occurs through the paradoxes of gift and counter-gift. In the practices of gift exchange which occur in certain cultural traditions, Ricoeur observes an enigma because it is not an obligation to give, or to receive, but

"to give in exchange, to give back". How do we explain the free, spontaneous character of these acts of giving? If we adhere to paradigms of action sociology which sacrifice the justifications of the actors to the existence of an external observer, then the exchange of gifts is seen as reciprocity and not mutuality. The strength of the link which binds the actors is subordinate to the self-referential nature of an autonomous system, in the terminology of the cognitive sciences (CR, 235).

In his commentaries when he describes the logic of giving, Ricoeur refers reciprocity our heads and mutuality to the factual reality of circulation. If reciprocity circulates as a flow, confidence is decisive for maintaining that flow. It serves to introduce an element or factor of risk, meaning that the entry of the gift on the plane of action is not effected without risk.

Another important reference in the logic of giving arises when we differentiate it from the market: "in the market there is no obligation to 'return' because there is no requirement; payment puts an end to the mutual obligations of the actors in the exchange. The market is reciprocity without mutuality. Thus the market refers us, by contrast, to the originality of the links proper to the exchange of gifts within the whole area of reciprocity: by making this contrast with the market, emphasis is placed on the generosity of the first giver, rather than on the requirement for return" (CR, 239).

Mutual recognition supposes an argument in defence of the mutuality of relations *between persons*, in contrast to the concept of reciprocity which theory places above persons and their transactions. The differentiation allows us to propose the two levels

with which to construct a culture of peace: the relational level of mutuality (mutual recognition) and the systemic level of reciprocity (reciprocal recognition). The keystone between the two lies in *symbolic mutual recognition.* Here Ricoeur introduces the category of the *priceless*; and he goes further, he asks us to think of human relations which are not mercantile in character. The ethic of giving reminds us that there are non mercantile goods:

> "it is the spirit of giving which causes a break within the category of goods, in solidarity with the interpretation of the whole of sociability as a vast distribution system. We will talk then of non mercantile goods, such as security, functions of authority, appointments and honours, since the priceless becomes a sign for the recognition of non mercantile goods. Inversely, perhaps we can find giving in all the forms of the priceless, since it has to do with moral dignity, which has a value but not a price, with bodily integrity, the non commercial donation of organs, not to mention the beauty of the body, of gardens, flowers and landscapes…" (CR, 243-244).

To protect the effective experiences of mutual recognition it is important to sharpen our critical capacity to distinguish between good and bad reciprocity. And for that it is important to recover states of peace such as *agape*; thus the ethic of giving is thought of under the sign of *agape*. Ricoeur thinks that the mutuality of giving and returning gifts must be thought of from the angle of *receiving.* The fascination exercised by returning the gift leads us to ignore important features of the practice of giving found on the way, such as offering, risking, accepting and, finally, "giving something of oneself by giving a simple object." Following Marcel Mauss in his

essay on giving, Ricoeur calls these *movements of the heart.* The ethic of giving claims a phenomenology of receiving, and with this emerges a significate which so far has been forgotten in research into recognition: to recognize is to thank[29].

29 In our opinion, the two basic categories for radical thought on moral and political philosophy in Paul Ricoeur are Critique and Heart. As we have shown in our work: Crítica y corazón. Introducción a la ética de Paul Ricoeur. (at press)

3. Culture of peace: from indignation to celebration

I would like to conclude these reflections on multicultural citizenship and conflict by recalling the importance of a culture of peace in the tradition initiated by Bartolomé de Las Casas. And in this spirit I would like to invite the readers of this address to carry out a small intellectual exercise: to extend an imaginary bridge between the proposal of that defender of the indians, and this philosopher of gratuitousness, Paul Ricoeur. With what we have already seen, there is no difficulty, especially if we consider that it is not indispensable to "send Aristotle out for a walk to be able to think in Spanish". And there is no difficulty if we keep alive the memory that is in our peoples, because "Long before Adorno, Bartolomé de Las Casas opened discussion on the epistemic dimension of the memory of injustice with an intellectual act of great theoretical profundity"[30].

30 I refer to the daring title of R. Mate "¡A paseo Aristóteles! Cómo pensar en español" [Aristotle, take a walk! How to think in Spanish.]: Claves 212 (2011), 70-76. The article takes its title from an expression of Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, who, in Valladolid, when the establishment sages were making proposals which instead of solving the injustices only aggravated them, asked them to "Send Aristotle out for a walk", reminding them to follow the invitation of the gospels to treat the other as their neighbour. Cf. B. las Casas, Apología. Editora Nacional, Madrid, 1975, p. 3.

The imaginary bridge which I propose takes up two basic ideas which have inspired the present work, and recover a third proposed by Ricoeur at the end of his analysis of recognition. The first is simple: the culture of peace can only be the fruit of justice. This justice is the horizon of the work which has marked our philosophical investigations on citizenship, above all when it ceases to be formal and avoids ethnocentric positions to feed on an intercultural ethic[31]. As we have seen in the first part of this exposition, multicultural citizenship situates us face to face with recognition politics and obliges us to dialogue both with liberalism and with its critics.

The second is not complicated either: philosophy cannot promote a culture of peace which ignores violence, struggle and conflicts. These are core problems in the political ethics of all times, and with them we are obliged to take a critical look at the anthropological assumptions of modernity. Given that philosophical practice must be an exercise of responsibility in the public spaces for deliberation where democratic institutions are constructed, we cannot propose an abstract or irenist concept of peace. We are obliged to construct a culture of peace from a responsibility marked by solidarity not only with those nearest to us but with the whole human family. The ethics of recognition help us because they take us away from the solipsism of specialities, of academies and metropoli. As we have seen, the distinction between reciprocity and mutuality contributes to a new way of looking at formal, legal or strictly positive recognition. It situates recognition in daily life so that it is not a strictly cognitive or intellectual category but one which is existential and vital.

31 R. Salas, Ética intercultural. LOM Editores, Santiago 2003.

Finally, I would like to record that struggles for recognition may become interminable, and keep us eternally not only morally dissatisfied or indignant but occupied and amused. A culture of peace cannot be constructed without taking into account what Ricoeur calls states of peace, i.e. *philia, eros or agape*, as we have seen, not in order to do without justice but to keep it alive and awake. A culture of peace requires critical capacity and generosity of heart; if it lacks either of these two capacities it will always be one-sided. Furthermore, it requires us never to forget what Ricoeur calls the festive nature of exchange: *"The festive occurs in practices of giving, just as solemnity occurs in the act of pardon* or, rather, of asking for pardon… acts which cannot create an institution but which, when the outline of a justice of equivalence emerges, and a space for hope opens… set in motion an irradiating, irrigating wave which, secretly and indirectly, contributes to the progress of history towards states of peace. The festive… belongs to the grammatical patronage of the optative… the exchange of gifts in its festive phase confers on the struggle for recognition the certainty that the motivation which distinguishes it from appetite for power was not illusory or useless, but shelters it from the fascination with violence" (CR, 250-251).

In sum, a bridge between the radicalism of evangelical inspiration which moved Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, and the hermeneutical ethic of Ricoeur, to promote a renewed culture of peace. Perhaps eternally new when it invites us to tread the path which leads from indignation to celebration.

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