Multiculturalidad y discrecionalidad judicial en una sentencia penal: análisis desde Joseph Raz
Multiculturalidad y discrecionalidad judicial en una sentencia penal: análisis desde Joseph Raz
Authors
Authors
Date
2015-07-29
Datos de publicación:
Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, N°32, 327-343, 2009
Keywords
Discrecionalidad judicial - Moralidad pública - Sentencia penal - Multiculturalidad - Joseph Raz
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Abstract
A partir del razonamiento judicial utilizado en una sentencia penal mostramos cómo el juez acudió a una moral particular para justificar su fallo y discurrimos si tenía discrecionalidad para ello. Planteamos que la coacción no se justifica como sanción a una práctica cultural, aunque dicha práctica atente contra el principio del daño, si no se satisface además el principio de culpabilidad, así, trabajamos la hipótesis de que los jueces confundieron la función de aplicar la ley con la de neutralizar prácticas culturales opresivas.
Finalmente, analizamos si la doctrina moral elegida por el juez es coherente con una moralidad pública centrada en la autonomía utilizando para ello, tanto el liberalismo multicultural como el positivismo excluyente de Joseph Raz.
From the judicial reasoning used in a penal judgment, we show how the judge came to a particular morality to justify the sentence and evaluate he had discretion for it. We raise that the constraint does not justify itself as sanction to a cultural practice, though the above mentioned practice commits an outrage against the principle of the damage, if the principle of guilt is not satisfied in addition, this way, we work the hypothesis of which the judges confused the function to apply the law with it of neutralizing cultural oppressive practices. Finally, we analyze if the moral doctrine chosen by the judge is coherent with a public morality centred on the autonomy using for it, both the multicultural liberalism and Joseph Raz"s exclusive positivism.
From the judicial reasoning used in a penal judgment, we show how the judge came to a particular morality to justify the sentence and evaluate he had discretion for it. We raise that the constraint does not justify itself as sanction to a cultural practice, though the above mentioned practice commits an outrage against the principle of the damage, if the principle of guilt is not satisfied in addition, this way, we work the hypothesis of which the judges confused the function to apply the law with it of neutralizing cultural oppressive practices. Finally, we analyze if the moral doctrine chosen by the judge is coherent with a public morality centred on the autonomy using for it, both the multicultural liberalism and Joseph Raz"s exclusive positivism.