Juan Cortés de Monroy y sus remedios a la guerra de Chile: un memorial oportunista
Juan Cortés de Monroy y sus remedios a la guerra de Chile: un memorial oportunista
Authors
Viforcos Marinas, Isabel
Authors
Date
2014-09-01
Datos de publicación:
10.7770/CUHSO-V23N2-ART614
Keywords
Cortés de Monroy - Chile - Guerra
Collections
Abstract
En este trabajo se aborda una revisión de la figura de Juan Cortés
de Monroy (1584-1653), quien tras 15 años de servicio en la guerra de Chile,
acompañó a su padre, el maestre de campo Pedro Cortés, a Castilla, para
abogar por el fin de la guerra defensiva. Desde 1613 desarrolló una intensa
actividad en la Corte para procurarse las mercedes de las que se consideraba
acreedor, por sus años de servicio y, sobre todo, por los más de 60 que su
padre había dedicado a la guerra chilena. En esa estrategia, aprovechando
los nuevos vientos de la política «reputacionista» de Olivares, se sumó a
la tercera ofensiva por la vuelta a una guerra activa como único medio de
aquietar a los indios chilenos, con un memorial en el que se proponían algunos
remedios para asegurar una victoria que llevaba resistiéndose desde
hacía más de medio siglo. Además de aportar precisiones significativas sobre
su biografía, se reflexiona sobre su proyecto, presentado en 1625, antes de
partir a cumplir con sus obligaciones como gobernador de Veragua, y las
respuestas aportadas en octubre de ese año, cuando ya estaba tomada la
decisión de volver a las hostilidades activas. Del análisis y la comparativa
con otras iniciativas desarrolladas desde el principio del siglo XVII, cabe
concluir que el memorial de Cortés, salvo en el empeño con que defiende la
asunción de la dirección de la guerra por parte del Virrey del Perú, no ofrece
ninguna solución novedosa, ni aporta datos significativos que revelen conocimientos estratégicos dignos de tener en cuenta. En consecuencia, creemos
que su memorial no fue sino una estrategia oportunista en su empeño por
hacerse visible ante el Consejo y vencer, al amparo de los méritos de su padre
y su abuelo, las resistencias para la obtención del hábito de Santiago,
además de un recurso para denunciar la injusticia con que se trataba a los
«viejos soldados» que, careciendo de «padrinazgos» suficientes en el Consejo,
veían acabar su vida sin la remuneración debida a sus servicios.
This study contains a review of the character and role of Juan Cortés de Monroy (1584-1653). After 15 years’ service in the war in Chile, he accompanied his father, grand master Pedro Cortés, to Spain to plead for an end to the defensive war. From 1613, he worked intensively in the Court to obtain the favours which he considered were owed to him, for his years of service and especially for the more than sixty years that his father had served in the Chilean war. Moulding his strategy in accordance with the new «reputationist» politics of Olivares, he took part in the third attempt to place the war on an offensive footing as the only way of pacifying the Chilean Indians. To this end, he produced a memorandum containing proposals to ensure the victory which had eluded the Spaniards for over half a century. The memorandum not only provides concrete biographical information, but also is a rumination on his project presented in 1625 before he departed to assume the governorship of Veraguas. It also contains the answers that were given in October of that year, when the decision to resume active hostilities had been made. After analysing Cortés’ memorandum and comparing it with other initiatives from the beginning of the 17th century, we must conclude that it offers neither new solutions nor significant information on any strategic knowledge of special interest except in the determination with which he defends the leadership of the war taken by the Viceroy of Peru. This memorandum was no more than an opportunistic strategy to attract the attention of the Council of the Indies, and to profit from the merits of his father and grandfather in order to overcome resistance to his appointment to the Order of Santiago. It was also a way of denouncing the unjust treatment meted out to old soldiers who, because they lacked «godfathers» in the Council, ended their days without receiving the remuneration due for their services.
This study contains a review of the character and role of Juan Cortés de Monroy (1584-1653). After 15 years’ service in the war in Chile, he accompanied his father, grand master Pedro Cortés, to Spain to plead for an end to the defensive war. From 1613, he worked intensively in the Court to obtain the favours which he considered were owed to him, for his years of service and especially for the more than sixty years that his father had served in the Chilean war. Moulding his strategy in accordance with the new «reputationist» politics of Olivares, he took part in the third attempt to place the war on an offensive footing as the only way of pacifying the Chilean Indians. To this end, he produced a memorandum containing proposals to ensure the victory which had eluded the Spaniards for over half a century. The memorandum not only provides concrete biographical information, but also is a rumination on his project presented in 1625 before he departed to assume the governorship of Veraguas. It also contains the answers that were given in October of that year, when the decision to resume active hostilities had been made. After analysing Cortés’ memorandum and comparing it with other initiatives from the beginning of the 17th century, we must conclude that it offers neither new solutions nor significant information on any strategic knowledge of special interest except in the determination with which he defends the leadership of the war taken by the Viceroy of Peru. This memorandum was no more than an opportunistic strategy to attract the attention of the Council of the Indies, and to profit from the merits of his father and grandfather in order to overcome resistance to his appointment to the Order of Santiago. It was also a way of denouncing the unjust treatment meted out to old soldiers who, because they lacked «godfathers» in the Council, ended their days without receiving the remuneration due for their services.